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Most recessions are a result of some shock to the economic system, typically amplified by 
financial accelerators, and leading to large balance sheet effects of households and firms, which 
result in the effects persisting.  But, over time, the balance sheets get restored.  Even banks 
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But episodically, the “shock” is deeper.  It is structural.  Among advanced countries, the 
movement from agricultural to manufacturing in the last century, and the more recent movement 
from manufacturing to the service sector reflect such a large economic transformation.  The 
associated downturns are longer lasting.  The usual responses, in particular, monetary policy, are 
only of limited efficacy.  Policies have to be designed to facilitate such transformations:  markets 
on their own typically do not do well.
This paper explains why such transformations are associated with persistently high 
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of the Great Depression both for the advanced countries and the developing countries as they go 
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Abstract 
Most recessions are a result of some shock to the economic system, typically 
amplified by financial accelerators, and leading to large balance sheet effects of 
households and firms, which result in the effects persisting.  But, over time, the 
balance sheets get restored.  Even banks recover.   
But episodically, the “shock” is deeper.  It is structural.  Among advanced 
countries, the movement from agricultural to manufacturing in the last century, 
and the more recent movement from manufacturing to the service sector reflect 
such a large economic transformation.  The associated downturns are longer 
lasting.  The usual responses, in particular, monetary policy, are only of limited 
efficacy.  Policies have to be designed to facilitate such transformations:  markets 
on their own typically do not do well. 
This paper explains why such transformations are associated with persistently 
high unemployment, and describes the effects of particular government policies.  
It looks at the lessons of the Great Depression both for the advanced countries 
and the developing countries as they go through their structural transformations. 
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Economies are always changing, and one of the virtues of the market economy is 
its ability to adapt to these changes.  Primitive agriculture economies face 
weather variability.  Manufacturing economies are marked by new products.  
Rivals have to constantly adapt to the changing competitive landscape. 
But beyond these changes, there are a few major structural changes, large 
changes that occur very infrequently.  The movement from feudalism to the post-
feudal era was such a change.  The industrial revolution was another—but even 
after the onset of the industrial revolution, the economy remained largely 
agrarian.  It was not until one hundred to one hundred and fifty years later that 
the structural change—the move from a rural agrarian economy to an urban 
manufacturing society occurred.  That was a traumatic event. 3   
Markets don’t handle such changes well, nor typically do the political processes 
governing markets.  The purpose of this paper is (a) to explain why it is that 
markets on their own manage these transitions so poorly; (b) to show that when 
the structural transformation is not well managed, there may be a prolonged 
economic downturn (recessions and depressions), arguing that this is at least part 
of the explanation for the Great Depression and the Great Recession;  (c) to 
analyze the effects of government actions that might help manage these 
structural transformations, and in particular, the role of industrial policy in 
facilitating these transitions; and (d) to set these industrial policies as a critical 
part of Keynesian counter-cyclical policies.  We set much of our discussion in the 
context of the last major structural transformation confronting the advanced 
countries, the transition from being an agrarian economy to manufacturing, 
because we can see the principles better from the perspective of 80 years.  But in 
                                                          
2 University Professor, Columbia University.  Paper prepared for the Oxford Handbook of Structural 
Transformation, edited by Celestin Monga and Justin Yifu Lin. This paper is part of a larger research project with 
Bruce Greenwald.  I wish to acknowledge the financial support of INET, research assistance of Matthieu Teachout 
and editorial assistance of Debarati Ghosh.   
3 Described so forcefully by K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 1944, Farrar & Rinehart. 
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the last two sections of this paper, we discuss their implications for  the 2008 
recession and the broader management of cyclical fluctuations.    
  
I. The failure of markets and politics to manage structural transformations 
The reason for the failure of markets and politics to manage structural 
transformations is simple.  The economic and political structures are designed for 
stability, including the maintenance of existing power relationships.  The system is 
good at handling small shocks, but does not adapt well when managing big 
changes. 
In the economic sphere, big changes lead to large (and typically unanticipated) 
changes in asset values.  In the transition to manufacturing, as farmers migrated 
out of the rural sector, the assets owned by farmers (in particular, their homes) 
decreased in value.  Their human capital was even more affected:  farmers were 
well attuned to the nuances of weather, disease, etc. in their locale as it related to 
the production of the particular crops in which they specialized, but those skills 
were largely unrelated to the skills required for manufacturing.   
Manufacturing occurs largely in urban centers (and for good reasons). The move 
from agriculture to manufacturing thus also required a massive change in the 
structure of housing.   
Typically in a decentralized market economy, the individual is responsible for 
obtaining the human capital that he requires to be productive, beyond his basic 
education.  Individuals are responsible too for relocation costs, including those 
associated with the purchase of a new home.4  In short, moving from the old 
sectors to the new sectors is difficult and requires resources.  Structural 
transformation requires up front capital expenditures.  Large fractions of 
individuals that should be making the transition do not have the resources to 
finance this transformation; and given the imperfections of capital markets—
which can be explained in terms of imperfections and asymmetries of 
                                                          
4 There are good reasons for owner-occupancy; nonetheless, some market economies rely on rental housing, so 
that the provision of housing relies on specialized private enterprises.  Here, the problem is that the net worth of 
these enterprises may suffer significant adverse effects in the process of structural transformation, and thus may 
not be able to provide the new housing required in the urban area.  In this case, however, it is more likely that new 
enterprises will be created to provide housing for new migrants to the urban sector. 
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information—they cannot obtain finance.  Indeed, the structural transformation 
itself makes it even more difficult to obtain the finance.  Banks that have invested 
substantial amounts in the rural sector (in the “old” sector)—that is,  have lent 
substantial amounts to that sector—also   experience significant losses.  The fact 
that the value of housing in the rural sector has diminished implies that a 
fraction—perhaps a large fraction—of the loans will go into default.  So too for 
loans made to finance other investments in the rural (old) sector.  Thus, the net 
worth of banks will experience a negative shock.  And this will reduce their ability 
and willingness to lend.5   
Moreover, these local institutions have the detailed information that allows them 
to judge the creditworthiness of the borrower.  But the structural transformation 
has attenuated even the value of that information, since knowing an individual’s 
competence in the rural sector might provide only limited information about his 
performance in the urban. 
Moreover, moving is risky:  there are clear upfront costs, with large uncertainties 
about the returns.  Will the individual find a good job, an adequate home, a 
community in which the family thrives?  There are no markets to which 
individuals can turn to obtain insurance against these risks.   
The result is that large changes in technology (and preferences) do not quickly get 
translated into the kinds of changes in the overall economy that one would have 
expected, if one analyzed the equilibrium that might have occurred using a model 
with costless mobility of resources.6  We will explain shortly how government 
intervention can facilitate the transition. 
But here, too, we encounter difficulties.  Political institutions tend to reflect 
existing power structures.  And these existing power structures derive their 
power, at least to some extent, from their existing economic power, and the 
structural transformations under discussion undermine those power relations.  
Thus, rather than facilitating the transition, too often government lends its weight 
in the other direction, trying to preserve the status quo and the power structures 
associated with it.  Nowhere is that more evident in the example which is the 
                                                          
5 See B. Greenwald and J. E. Stiglitz, Towards a New Paradigm in Monetary Economics, 2003, Cambridge University 
Press. 
6 There are, in addition, large social costs.  Individuals have built up networks of relationships which are not only a 
direct source of “utility” but also provide strong systems of social support.   
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focus of the discussion of this paper, the movement from agrarian economies to 
manufacturing.  The political institutions created in the nineteenth century gave 
undue weight to the rural agrarian communities, and the mindset of these 
communities may be at odds with that of dominant urban communities.  While 
this disparity between politics and the underlying economic realities is stark, the 
disparity is even greater when it comes to the movement now underway into the 
postindustrial societies, to the service and knowledge based economies of the 21st 
centuries.7   
 
II. Interpretation of the Great Depression 
 
The Great Depression provides a good illustration of the principles just discussed, 
and the consequences of the impediments to an easy transition.  The underlying 
“shock” to the economy leading to the downturn was an increase in agricultural 
productivity.8  In the absence of frictions, this would have moved the utilities 
possibilities curve outward, i.e. assuming that lump sum redistributions were 
possible, everyone could have been made better off.  (Without government 
                                                          
7 While a political system disproportionately representing the agrarian mindset only put minor roadblocks in the 
creation of the manufacturing economy, the impediments put in place by a political system with disproportionate 
weight given to the rural and dying manufacturing regions of a country for the efficient development of the post-
industrial economies may be far greater.  An interesting aspect of manufacturing in the US today is that much of it 
has moved out of the urban areas to more rural locations.  Low wages, low costs of land, and good transportation 
system reversed the earlier advantages of urban locations.   
 
8 We do not present the evidence for this claim here.  Note though that there was a drop in income of farmers of 
some 50 percent to 75 percent, and that the rural sector represented some 70 percent of the economy at the time.  
With reasonable multipliers, it is easy to see how this could translate into a macroeconomic downturn of the 
magnitude observed.   
    There is a long-standing debate about the relative importance of different factors in contributing to the Great 
Depression, with some economists (e.g. B. Eichengreen, Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great 
Depression, 1919-1939, Oxford University Press, 1992) emphasizing the role of the gold standard and others (e.g. 
M. Friedman and A. J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867- 1960, Princeton University Press, 
1963) that of monetary policy.  Both of these clearly played a role, especially in the propagation and persistence of 
the downturn.  We emphasize here, however, the role of the “productivity shock” in agriculture as the source of 
the perturbation to the economy.  The gold standard did introduce rigidities, making adjustment to the shock more 
difficult.  It is often noted that countries that went off the gold standard performed better.  But this says nothing 
about what would have happened if all had gone off the gold standard.  Countries going off the gold standard early 
clearly had a competitive advantage over those that waited.  A discussion of the role of monetary policy as a cause 
of the crisis would take us beyond this short paper.  Here, we simply note that the financial crisis occurred years 
after the onset of the Depression.  Any deep and prolonged downturn will give rise to a financial crisis.   
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intervention, the effects are  ambiguous, since the competitive equilibrium could 
entail some group being worse off.  This is the case with Hicksian labor-saving 
technological changes.)  In the new equilibrium, workers would have migrated 
from the rural sector to the urban sector.  Fewer workers are needed to produce 
the food required.  This is because the income elasticity and price elasticity of 
food is low.  The technological change leads to lower prices of agricultural goods, 
and this results in slightly higher demands—an increase in demand that is smaller 
than the increase in productivity.  Hence, incomes in the rural sector decline and 
workers migrate from the rural to the urban sector. 
 
With the real frictions described in the previous section, this may not be the case.  
Assume for the moment that mobility is zero.  Then those in agriculture will see 
their incomes go down, and as a result they will work harder (assuming income 
effects offset substitution effects) and this will lead to further decreases in 
agricultural prices and incomes.  (Each farmer believes that by working harder, his 
income will increase, but, because of the inelasticity of demand, when output 
increases, incomes actually fall.)  Those in the urban sector are better off—at first.  
But with farmers demanding fewer tractors and cars and other manufactured 
goods, the demand for urban goods decreases.  Assume, again for simplicity, that 
wages are fixed—say at the efficiency wage.  Then employment in the urban 
sector falls, leading to a decrease in demand for food, further depressing the price 
of food.  The equilibrium that emerges entails lower food prices and lower urban 
employment—in both sectors, workers  are worse off.9  What should have been 
an innovation could have made everyone better off—if the structural 
transformation could have efficiently been carried out—leads to immiseration, 
with welfare in both the rural and urban sectors decreased. 10  
 
                                                          
9 The lower wages increase the income of the owners of capital.  So long as the marginal propensity to consume of 
these capitalists is lower than that of workers, the results described here hold.  The adverse welfare effects hold so 
long as the marginal social utility of a dollar to the (higher income) capitalists is lower than that to workers.  Of 
course, workers who do retain jobs at the efficiency wage are unaffected.  Note that the efficiency wage (in terms 
of the prices of manufactured goods) may be lowered, because the price of food is lowered.   
10 Formal models showing what has been discussed in the previous section are provided in D. Delli Gati, M. 
Gallegati, B. Greenwald, A. Russo and J.E. Stiglitz,  “Mobility constraints, productivity trends and extended crisis”, 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol 83 (3), 2012 and D. Delli Gatti, M. Gallegati, B. Greenwald, A. 
Russo and J.E. Stiglitz,  “Sectoral imbalances and long-run crises”, in The Global Macro Economy and Finance (pp. 
61-97), edited by J. Fitoussi, R. Gordon and J.E. Stiglitz, Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
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It is interesting that President Roosevelt’s first response to the Great Depression 
(embodied in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933) was to restrict agricultural 
production.  This would have increased incomes in both the rural and urban 
sectors.  (Rural welfare would have been increased both because of the higher 
prices they receive for the goods they sell.11)  It was struck down by the Supreme 
Court, and widely criticized by economists, as an intervention in the workings of 
the market economy.  But it was, in fact, a clever application of the principle of 
the second best.  Given the market distortion (the inability of labor to move 
costlessly across sectors, and the inability to engage in lump sum redistributions) 
such interventions may in fact have been desirable.   
 
In the end, it was World War II that brought the US economy out of the Great 
Depression.  The demand for munitions and armaments and troops required 
moving people out of the rural sector, and training individuals for a 
manufacturing society helped in the transition.  After the war, the GI bill, which 
provided a university education to all of those who had fought in the war (which 
was almost all men, and many women) provided the human capital needed for 
the transformation from an agrarian economy to a manufacturing economy.  The 
forced savings during the war and deferred consumption helped provide the basis 
of strong aggregate demand, substituting for government military expenditures 
which diminished rapidly after the war, thus averting the widely expected post-
war recession.   
 
In short, war expenditures were more than a Keynesian stimulus; they constituted 
(unknowingly) an industrial policy, critical in engineering a structural 
transformation.   
 
III. Interpretation of the 2008 crisis 
The 2008 crisis is often thought of as a financial crisis—and clearly, as part of the 
crisis, many financial institutions were close to collapsing.  But to understand the 
crisis itself and what could have been done to help the economy emerge from it, 
we must dig deeper. 
                                                          
11 As producers (seller of agricultural goods), we can express their welfare through an indirect utility function 
depending just on the price of agricultural goods relative to urban goods.  
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By analogy to the Great Depression, one can think of globalization and the 
increases in productivity in manufacturing as the underlying drivers of the Great 
Recession.  The growth in productivity in manufacturing has exceeded the growth 
in demand for manufactured goods, and that means globally, there will be a 
decrease in manufacturing employment; and globalization means that the 
advanced countries will be seizing a diminishing share of this diminishing amount.  
But that in turn means these workers have to find employment elsewhere.  One 
way of thinking of the real estate bubble in the US was that it was one way that 
the US temporally solved the problem.  It provided jobs for the men who had lost 
jobs in manufacturing.   
So too, the low interest rates of the Federal Reserve which fed the housing bubble 
were a reflection of the weak aggregate demand resulting from the underlying 
weakness in manufacturing.  There were, of course, other ways by which the 
economy/society could have responded. There could have been an increase in 
fiscal expenditures.    So too, monetary policy  might not have led to a real estate 
bubble under alternative regulatory frameworks.   
Of course, the collapse of the financial sector amplified the downturn.   
Given that the obvious symptom of the crisis was the collapse of a major bank, 
Lehman Brothers, and the real threat of the collapse of the entire financial sector, 
in the aftermath, it was natural to refer to the crisis as a  financial crisis.  That led 
to a focus on the financial sector, including its recapitalization.  But years later, 
when the banks were largely recapitalized, the downturn continued, suggesting at 
least that the downturn was not just a financial crisis. 
So too, some have said it was a “balance sheet recession.”  Essentially all major 
downturns are balance sheet downturns, i.e. the downturn leads to a weakening 
of the balance sheets of firms as well as banks, and this leads to a contraction 
both of production (in effect, a shift of the aggregate supply curve to the left) and 
demand—a shift in the demand curve for investment.  There is nothing distinctive 
in this matter for the 2008 crisis.12 And again, by a few years after 2008, balance 
                                                          
12 For an analysis of balance sheet recessions, see B. Greenwald and J. E. Stiglitz, “New and Old Keynesians”, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(1), Winter 1993, p23-44; B. Greenwald and J. E. Stiglitz, “Financial Market 
Imperfections and Business Cycles,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(1), February 1993, pp. 77-114; B. 
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sheets were largely restored:  large corporations were sitting on a couple trillion 
dollars of cash.  It was not balance sheets that were constraining investment, but 
aggregate demand.  The question was, what was constraining aggregate demand? 
Our analysis suggests it was the failure to advance on the necessary structural 
transformation, transforming the US from a manufacturing economy to a service 
sector economy.  Just as farmers were “trapped” in the agricultural sector, unable 
to move to the manufacturing sector, so too now manufacturing workers are 
trapped, lacking the skills that would enable them to be productive in the 
expanding sectors of the economy and unwilling and unable to make the 
investments that would give them the skills and move themselves to the locations 
where the jobs were being created.13 
Again, Keynesian policies could have filled in the void in aggregate demand, but in 
fact, the growth of public sector employment fell short of what would have been 
expected on the basis of the growth of the working age population.  As in World 
War II, structural Keynesian policies might have succeeded in facilitating the 
structural transformation, with industrial policies supporting the new sectors, and 
retraining policies (active labor market policies)  helping move people form the 
old sectors to the new. 
The changing structure of the economy towards services itself has important 
implications:  many of the sectors into which the economy was shifting were 
service sectors in which government traditionally has played a pivotal role, like 
education, health and care for the aged.  Without government support, these 
sectors were constrained, and so as the manufacturing sector declined, the new 
sectors where workers might naturally have found employment didn’t grow. 
IV. Remarks on industrial policies as cyclical policies14 
                                                          
Greenwald and J.E Stiglitz, Towards a New Paradigm of Monetary Economics, 2003, op. cit.; and R. Koo, Balance 
sheet recession: Japan's struggle with uncharted economics and its global implications, 2003, John Wiley & Sons. 
13 There are a host of other impediments to mobility, including the reluctance to leave one’s extended family and 
support systems.  The absence of a good rental market for housing impedes mobility, as does the lack of affordable 
day care, in those instances where members of the extended family provide such services.     
14 Industrial policies include any policies which help direct resources to or from a sector or encourage the adoption 
of a particular technology within a sector.  They are not limited to the promotion of “industry,” as that term is 
usually understood.  As I have noted elsewhere, all countries have industrial policies, hidden in the tax code or 
various aspects of the legal code.  Markets don’t exist in a vacuum; they have to be structured, and inevitably, how 




The two previous sections have emphasized the market failures that emerge in a 
structural transformation.  There is a natural role for government in correcting 
these market failures.  In particular, Keynesian policies can stimulate the 
economy.  In the case of the transformation from agriculture to industry, they 
increased incomes in both the agriculture and urban sectors.  The increased 
incomes by themselves would have facilitated the movement from the rural to 
the urban sector, thus partially addressing one of the key market failures.  But the 
expenditures during and after World War II were even more effective in enabling 
the transformation; they were unintentionally industrial policies, helping people 
move and giving them the training and education  needed to equip them to be 
productive in the expanding sectors of the economy.  There is a general principle 
here:  when the underlying problem facing an economy is the necessity of a 
major economic transformation, a key component of Keynesian cyclical policies 
are industrial policies to facilitate that transformation.   
 
Managing such policies is, however, not always easy. 
 
When a sector is facing competition from those outside the country, those in the 
sector will often claim either that there is unfair competition from abroad and/or 
the problems are only temporary, and a little help will enable the industry to 
recover and thrive.  (It is more efficient to provide short term support to the 
industry than to relocate the workers and see a long-term loss in human and 
organization capital, which would result from the closure of enterprises.)   
 
Both workers and firms have a self-interest in taking such a stance.  Even a 
successful relocation of workers may be associated with significant lowering of 
                                                          
become more compelling when there is a market failure—as here, a failure in the free mobility of labor.  See D. 
Rodrik, “Industrial Policy for the twenty-first century”, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4767, 2004; B. Greenwald and 
J.E. Stiglitz, “Industrial Policies, the Creation of a Learning Society, and Economic Development” in The Industrial 
Policy Revolution I: The Role of Government Beyond Ideology, J. E. Stiglitz and J. Yifu Lin (eds.), Houndmills, UK and 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 43-71; and J. E. Stiglitz, “Industrial Policy, Learning and Development”, in The 
Practice of Industrial Policy: Government-Business Coordination in Africa and East Asia, John Page and Finn Tarp 




wages.  Older workers trained for one sector may, even with retraining, be less 
productive in the new sector. There are several issues that have to be addressed. 
 
First, is the problem temporary?  Often, it is not.  Comparative advantages do 
change.  The US almost surely does not have a comparative advantage in the 
production of cars.  Germany, Japan, Korea, and China seem to have comparative 
advantages in different parts of the product spectrum, with Germany having a 
comparative advantage in high tech cars, and Korea and Japan in more mass 
produced cars.  The US comparative advantage in large gas guzzlers is not the 
basis of a successful 21st century automobile industry.   The US car companies 
have returned to profitability, but only by substantially lowering wages of their 
workers.   
 
Both firms and workers in the declining industry have an incentive to try to claim 
that the industry is just facing temporary difficulties, and a little help—if not 
outright subsidies, then a little protection—would do the trick.  Ascertaining 
whether the industry is facing temporary difficulties or has lost its long term 
comparative advantage is not easy.   
 
Second, domestic firms are always going to claim that competition from 
outside—when it is successful—is unfair.  They have to believe that they are 
more productive than firms elsewhere, so that if competition were fair, they 
would prevail.  But the reality is often otherwise.  It is not “unfair” for a country 
to be poor and have low wages; it is unfortunate.  The principle of comparative 
advantage says that even low wage countries have comparative advantages and 
disadvantages.  Again, of course, every firm complains about hidden subsidies.  
Those abroad complain about US bailouts which are given to its auto companies. 
Indeed any firm that borrows from an American bank is a beneficiary of the 
hundreds of billions of dollars that went to the financial sector in the bailout.  
Those outside the US claim that that gives American firms an unfair advantage.  
US monetary policy which keeps interest rates at near zero too is seen as giving 
American firms an unfair source of cheap capital.      
 
But there are cyclical fluctuations, and these fluctuations affect some industries 
more than others—the cyclically sensitive sectors.  Minimizing the deadweight 
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loss associated with cyclical fluctuations entails doing what can be done to 
stabilize the economy through monetary and fiscal policy.  One of the market 
failures which we have noted is the absence of state contingent insurance, and 
government provision of such insurance—that is, insurance which paid off in the 
event of a cyclical downturn—increases economic efficiency, and likely would 
also increase stability.    
 
Industrial policies, however, can be an important complement to these policies; 
and take on even greater importance as second best measures when the 
government fails to implement them fully effectively.  Industrial policies can   
simultaneously help the industry manage the downturn without excessive 
adverse effects to firms’ balance sheets (which would impede long run 
competitivity) and assist in the restructuring itself.  Because of capital market 
imperfections, an economic downturn, especially in a capital intensive industry 
with economies of scale, can lead to large (cash flow) losses, deteriorating 
balance sheets and inhibiting the ability to modernize and compete. 
 
Roosevelt’s Agriculture Adjustment Act, as we noted, is an example of such a 
policy.15  So too are state contingent tariffs, which increase tariffs or reduce 
quotas in a recession, so that producer prices are increased, reducing the losses 
confronting cyclically sensitive industries.   
 
Persistent unemployment is, in a sense, a symptom that the market economy is 
not working well.  We have also described how government interventions can, in 
such circumstances, provided symptomatic relief.  While there may be policies 
that go more directly at the root of the problem, it is better to intervene with 




V.  Concluding Remarks 
                                                          
15 Conventional literature has emphasized the market distortions associated with these policies.  Here, we are 
emphasizing the second and third best nature of these policies.  Obviously, it would be preferable to eliminate the 
cyclical fluctuations, or to manage the risk with state contingent insurance.  It would be preferable too to live in a 
world without capital constraints—but imperfections of information mean that these imperfections will always be 




Markets typically don’t work as well as the textbook models of perfect markets 
would suggest.  At times, these market failures become very significant, and 
government intervention is required.  This paper has discussed one such 
instance—the structural transformation of an economy.  We have explained why 
market failures are likely to be particularly significant when the economy is going 
through a major structural transformation, and described some of the market 
interventions that might address the market failures and facilitate the structure 
transformation.  When structural transformations are not managed well, the 
result can be deep and prolonged downturns.   In such situations, Keynesian 
industrial policies may simultaneously stimulate the economy, reduce 
unemployment, and facilitate the required transition.   
 
 
  
 
